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In this issue, Dr. Patricia Bragg’s article “Inventory Controls,” 
supplements her two previous contributions on automation 
and its effect on Montana’s business. This Spring Quarterly 
article deals with the importance of inventory control and 
management, focusing on how decisions can be computerized 
for more efficient operation in retailing. Dr. Bragg has been a 
research associate with the Bureau of Business and Economic 
Research since 1966, and is an Assistant Professor in the School 
of Business Administration.
Recently there has been much discussion concerning the 
drafting policies of the military, and it is evident some change 
will be necessary. Maurice Taylor, visiting Professor in the 
School of Business Administration, analyzes the alternative 
of a paid professional military force competing in the man­
power market. This solution is supported by many leading 
economists and seems to be a very reasonable way to make 
the military more equitable and efficient. Professor Taylor 
will be returning to the Agricultural Economics Department at 
Montana State University this coming fall.
Montanans know how important wheat is to the state’s 
economy, and the article by Mrs. Maxine Johnson entitled 
“Growth of An Export Market: The Inverse Rate Structure 
and Hard Spring Wheat,” explains one aspect of the freight 
rate structure that helps promote larger exports and increases 
dollar sales. Mrs. Johnson has been with the Bureau since 1950, 
and recently has been appointed to the Advisory Committee 
to study the multiple use of national forests by Secretary of 
Agriculture, Orville Freeman.





The survival of many Montana businesses in the next ten to 
fifteen years may well depend upon their willingness to eval­
uate the possibilities of computer usage. With this in mind, 
the Office of State Technical Services at the University of 
Montana is offering a Seminar on Practical Applications of 
Computers for Management at different locations throughout 
the state. Thus far, the seminar has been held in Missoula, 
Billings, and Great Falls; another is being planned for Kali- 
spell on July 26 and 27.
This seminar is designed to give Montana businessmen some 
guidelines that will be helpful to them in making an evalua­
tion about computers. The conference demonstrates how com­
puters work, what information goes into and comes out of the 
computer, and what the potential benefits and limitations of 
computers are. More specifically, attention is focused on the 
importance of manager involvement in decisions regarding 
computer applications. Because equipment salesmen and data 
processing experts do not necessarily know the problems and 
needs of a particular firm, the seminar stresses the importance 
of computer analysis by someone from within the company.
Dr. Patricia Bragg, Director of State Technical Services in 
Montana, heads this two-day conference. Her article on “In­
ventory Controls” in this issue covers one of the topics on the 
seminar agenda. Talks on the preparation of financial state­
ments, payroll applications, service bureaus, and related sub­
jects have been presented by faculty from the School of Busi­
ness Administration at the University of Montana, and by 
businessmen both from Montana and out of state. Guest 
speakers at individual locations have included Mr. M. H. 
Schwartz, Assistant Controller for Information Systems with 
the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, and Dr. Alfred Hoff- 
lander, Professor of Insurance at the University of California 
at Los Angeles. Guest speaker for the Kalispell conference 
has not yet been selected, but the program will otherwise re­
main the same. Anyone wishing to register for this conference
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may obtain information and registration forms from the Bu­
reau of Business and Economic Research at the University of 
Montana.
Businesses represented in the first three cities included ac­
counting, insurance, data processing, government, lumbering, 
retail and wholesale stores, banking, distributing, manufactur­
ing, real estate, and engineering. This list represents only a 
portion of the wide variety of Montana businesses which are 
considering the applications of computers.
Participating businessmen have discovered that automation 
may indeed play on important role in their own firm. How­
ever, the major emphasis is on an evaluation of—not neces­
sarily a conversion to—computers. Buying a computer may 
not be the answer for some companies. But the only way they 
can know for sure is to investigate the pros and cons of auto­
mation as thoroughly and with as much attention as possible.
Inventory Controls
PATRICIA P. BRAGG
Assistant Professor of Business Administration 
University of Montana, Missoula
The two previous issues of the Montana Business Quarterly 
have discussed technological change and its impact on Mon­
tana. These articles arrived at the conclusion that automation 
will affect not only Montana’s businesses, but its educational 
institutions and its employment patterns.
It is one thing to know that automation, and more specifically 
computers, will affect all Montanans and quite another to know 
what form this effect will take. Montana firms currently use 
computers for payroll and accounts receivable accounting, the 
preparation of financial statements and for controlling inven­
tories. The purpose of this article is to explore the applications 
of computers in the area of inventory control.
Two actual cases seem to illustrate the broad range of suc­
cess and failure that results from computer applications in 
inventory control. Mr. Daniel Melcher, a prominent publisher, 
reports that he had talked to one wholesaler who used the 
computer for inventory control, but had wound up with costs 
a good deal higher than one of his competitor’s. Mr. Melcher 
asked the wholesaler whether he really thought he could get 
his costs down. The wholesaler replied, “No, but I think the 
other fellow’s costs will rise—he’s automating too.”
On the other hand, a study of 30 retailers drawn from 20 
states and representing cities of less than 1,000 to over 1,000,000 
residents was completed recently. The study revealed that the 
retailers had increased gross profits by a median figure of two 
percent which could, as the researchers pointed out, amount 
to an eventual net profit increase of 50 percent. No Montana 
business can afford to ignore such figures.
Two aspects of inventory control are of most interest to Mon­
tana businessmen: first, before investing in an automatic sys­
tem, businessmen should have an idea of the advantages and 
disadvantages of using a computer to control inventory. 
Secondly, and more importantly, is the knowledge of how a 
computerized inventory system operates, what information
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goes into the computer, what information is returned, what 
form the data are in, and how a basic system can be adapted to 
fit the needs of a specific firm.
But first, it is necessary to establish the importance of inven­
tory control. After all, if inventory management is not an im­
portant aspect of making profits, then we are wasting our time 
talking about ways of controlling inventories. Many business­
men worry most about the way sales people create and main­
tain the image of a business. Sales personnel are constantly 
reminded, for example, that the customer is always right. 
Salespeople are sent to special industry meetings to learn how 
to sell the customer; each year a whole host of new sales rou­
tines are introduced on the market—all designed to get the 
customer to buy; and when a sale is not made, the first person 
to get the blame is the salesman. Few people ever stop to 
analyze how many of those “lost sales” were due to merchan­
dise rather than sales-related reasons. Several studies made to 
determine the causes of “lost sales” have consistently revealed 
that for every sale lost through poor salesmanship, an average 
of 25 sales were lost through merchandise-related reasons. 
Many of those 25 lost sales occurred when a firm offered in­
sufficient selection or failed to restock an item and so forth. 
This fact alone gives us some idea of the importance of inven­
tory control. However, insufficient inventory is only one-half 
of the problem. If businessmen concentrate solely on maintain­
ing a sufficient inventory stock, they are also in danger of going 
broke. Each item of inventory costs something, and a firm who 
ties up too much capital in inventory by trying to anticipate 
all customer demands is not operating efficiently. In short, at 
one extreme too many customer demands are not met and, at 
the other, resources are not allocated productively. Inventory 
control procedures are important because they provide a 
balance between these extremes—a way of balancing the costs 
and benefits of the two decision rules.
Once a firm realizes the importance of inventory control, it 
is ready to examine methods of controlling inventories and, 
more specifically, to discover how a computer might be used 
to implement control procedures. As a general rule, control 
procedures can be set up wherever a decision is made. For 
example, “when to order” is one decision—one for which con­
trol procedures can be established. Therefore, in order to 
understand an inventory control system, decisions regarding 
inventories must be examined. Chart I outlines the decision
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process for inventories. Within that process there are roughly 
four decision points. First, a decision is made regarding the 
time to reorder; that is, should tomato soup be reordered when 
there are two cases left in stock, or when there are only 5 cans 
left. This is the reorder point decision. Secondly, a decision 
must be made which determines how frequently the cans of 
tomato soup are counted—each day, every week, or perhaps 
once a month. This is the evaluation decision. Then on the 
day or month or week that the supply of tomato soup gets 
down to the reorder level, the third decision point is reached 
Just how many cases should be reordered? This is called the
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reorder quantity decision. The fourth and last decision depends 
on when and how the buyer is notified.
These four decisions are the crux of any inventory control 
system, whether the system is manual or automatic. No con­
trols will be successful or profitable until the businessman has 
defined what it is he wants to control; then if the reorder point, 
the evaluation, the reorder quantity and the notification to 
buyers are controlled, his inventories will be controlled.
This relationship between controlling decisions and control­
ling inventories brings up a factor which is often neglected in a 
discussion of inventory control by computers: the elements of 
a computerized system are the same as a manual system. 
Furthermore, the single biggest advantage of using a computer 
is that it will force the user to sit down and examine all the 
decisions which relate to inventories. That is, the gains are 
made from the discipline which the system imposes on the user 
and from the orderly format of the monthly or quarterly inven­
tory reports. There is nothing magical about the computer and 
what it accomplishes—only that its usage forces regularity, 
consistency, and continual review. Businessmen often make the 
resolution that next year things are going to change: inven­
tories will be checked periodically, the number and frequency 
of those checks depending on the turnover and price of the 
item. And yet how many times during that “next year” do they 
end up counting and reordering only because of customer re­
quests or tax requirements. Advantages of inventory control 
procedures are foregone unless inventory counts and reorder 
schedules are systematic and regular. If a computer application 
is to be fully utilized and profitable, the “resolutions” must 
become an automatic part of the operation.
The necessity of determining useful information about the 
inventory to be controlled, the order point and the order quan­
tity was discussed earlier. But how does a firm determine the 
actual numerical values? For example, how does a firm deter­
mine whether 5 or 10 cases of tomato soup should be reordered? 
Numerous methods—ranging from very simple to very com­
plex—are available for determining the actual values; the ones 
presented here are only used as examples and would not 
necessarily be applicable to all businesses.
The items of inventory to be controlled by computers would 
depend upon the size of the business, the number of different 
inventory items, and the distribution of sales. A manual sys­
tem could be maintained for part of the inventory and the
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computer used only for large sales items. The best way to 
determine this is to prepare a listing of inventory items. An 
example of such a listing is included as Table I. In this example 
it is assumed that the retailer has 10 items in inventory— 
10,000 units could be listed just as easily. Of special importance 
is the last column—by comparing column 3 with column 7, 
it can be noted that about 13 percent of the items account for 
















Sales PercentA - l l l  ____ 43 1.6 48,859 3.07 150,000 150,000 67.3
A-412 ____ 80 3.1 6,762 4.88 33,001 183,001 82.1
B-701 .... 110 4.2 3,428 5.90 20,228 203,229 91.2
G-928 200 7.7 22,224 .45 10,001 213,230 95.7
K-217 ___ 330 12.7 9,912 .56 5,551 218,781 98.2
H-372 ____ 500 19.2 1,138 1.72 1,957 220,738 99.0
M-212 800 30.8 1,047 1.25 1,309 222,047 99.6
S-612 1,600 61.5 1,918 .28 537 222,584 99.8
B-900 ...... 2,000 76.9 27 .10 275 222,859 99.9
1-290 ..... . 2,600 100.0 214 .14 30 222,889 100.0
fact, representative of a firm’s experience, the businessman 
could decide to have only 13 percent of his inventory on com­
puter. If the rest of the items are unimportant, the gain from 
devoting too much effort to their control would be negligible. 
This approach is sound, and is easiest to explain and implement 
with a distribution-by-value list. To many owners, the figures 
in Table I are astounding. One wholesaler, when given the 
list, stated flatly that its use alone could pay for the cost of an 
inventory study.
Secondly, for those items which we decide to control through 
the use of a computer, we must determine an order point. A 
rather simple equation for order point is:
Order Point =  (lead time +  % review time) x (forecast of
sales per time unit) +  (safety stock)
Lead time starts when an order is written and ends when 
the merchandise is received and made available to the cus­
tomer. Review time is the number of days, weeks, or months 
between inventory counts or reviews. The forecast of sales is 
usually based on past history. Safety stock only allows some
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margin for error; the longer the inventory control procedures 
are in effect, the smaller the margin for error should become. 
The order quantity is the next decision to be made, and it can 
be determined as follows:
Order Quantity =  (number of weeks’ supply) x (forecast of
weekly sales rate)
For example, if the forecast indicates that item A -lll (Table 
I) will sell at an average rate of 5 units per week and the man­
ager has elected to order a three-week supply, then:
OQ =  (3 weeks) x ( sales rate of 5 units per week) =  15 units 
Finally, to determine the actual quantity ordered, it is neces­
sary to adjust the order quantity by the amount on hand and 
that already on order. In short, knowledge of the items to be 
included in the computerized control system, the order point, 
and the order quantity are necessary for any basic inventory 
control system. Essentially, this information can all be stored 
in the computer by giving each inventory item a code number.
Having attached numerical values to the control points, the 
next and probably the most important step remains, that of 
deciding what information is necessary to control inventories. 
What information does the person responsible for controlling 
inventories need to implement his decisions? This fundamental 
question, unfortunately, can only be answered in the broadest 
of terms because there are no two managers whose informa­
tion needs are exactly the same. The needed information in­
cludes everything the particular manager must have to: (1) 
develop plans and standards of inventory control; (2) measure 
actual performance and take appropriate action when perfor­
mance varies from the standard; and (3) evaluate the planning 
results. Although it is impossible to specify what every mana­
ger needs regarding inventory information, it is less difficult 
to describe what he does not need. He does not need more 
information than he can possibly use, nor does he need detailed 
information about relatively unimportant matters, and that 
information which is outdated is certainly of no use to him.
With these general guidelines in mind, it is possible to out­
line some broad general types of information which would be 
useful in controlling inventories. For example, the manager 
would need to know which items are contributing the largest 
amount to gross profits, a current report on sales volume by 
line of merchandise and the apparent trends in customer de­
mand. Depending upon the type of business, it may also be 
important to know when peak demands occur, again by line
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of merchandise, and by how much peak order requirements 
differ from normal stock. If several different suppliers are 
involved, the average lead time for order shipments may also 
be important. For those firms with fashion-oriented merchan­
dise, data such as a best sellers report, a listing of hot, slow- 
moving and aged items by vendor, a weekly comparision of last 
year’s and this year’s sales, price comparisons by line of mer­
chandise, and seasonal item reports are of considerable value.
This general statement of information requirements has two 
implications for designing the control system. First, unless 
management is involved in designing the control system, it is 
unlikely that a computer will improve inventory control. No 
outsider nor “system designer” could possibly understand the 
complexities of a specific inventory control program better 
than the manager responsible for inventory control. In at­
tempting to provide more and better information for decision 
making, the first step is to ask the managers what information 
they need. Secondly, there are numerous standardized pro­
grams available for inventory control such as IMPACT. But 
since no two firms are identical, the probability that these 
standard programs will totally satisfy the control requirements 
is very low. Although such a program may appear to be in­
expensive, the price of a substandard system—one which does 
not fit the specific needs of the firm—will outweigh the savings.
In summary, no one inventory control system would be 
applicable to all businesses. “Package” plans are rarely success­
ful unless adapted to fit specialized needs. As long as manage­
ment has some understanding of what the information capabil­
ities of the computer are, and what information is required, a 
system designed to fit a particular business may prove less 
expensive in the end.
Once management has a clear understanding of what can be 
done with the computer, they must next ask if it should be 
done. There are several pros and cons of adopting computer­
ized inventory controls. As we noted earlier, the computer 
can only do those things which it is programmed to do; that 
being the case, any system designed for a firm or that of a client 
is only as good as management makes it.
One of the important advantages of an automated system is 
that it helps to implement decisions. Again, the businessman 
who says that next year he is going to review inventories more 
frequently must follow through with this decision. Assuming 
a three-month periodic review is included in an automatic
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system, the scheduled review must occur. If that period is built 
into the system, the system will not function without the re­
view. Conversely, in a manual system failure to carry out 
those “resolutions” does not necessarily mean that the system 
will not function, although profits will probably decline.
Secondly, because the computer processes more information 
much more rapidly than is possible under a manual system, it 
affords management with more “think” time and less “paper 
shuffling” time. Many businessmen have thought about some 
of the checks that could be run on the business if only there 
was time. For example, sales projections could be reviewed 
and compared with actual sales by line of merchandise. If 
inventory controls are set up properly on the computer, these 
reviews become automatic and allow more time to give to the 
future rather than the current status of a business.
Since computer applications help to implement decisions, 
and because they provide more information in less time and 
therefore facilitate a continual review of operations, they of­
fer two additional advantages. First, if the system is a good 
one, inventory investments will decrease over a period of time 
as the manager learns to use the information effectively. In­
itially, however, inventories tend to increase because better 
merchandise control improves service to the customer; the in­
ventory increases from better service usually come before the 
decreases of “dead weight” items.
Lastly, there is more operating flexibility. Many times we 
continue to do something the same way just because it’s the 
way we have always done it. Sometimes one small change 
seems to make us more willing to change other things; adopt­
ing a new method of inventory control, just because of the 
procedures necessary to develop it and because of the increase 
in relevant information, will probably make additional profit­
able alternatives more apparent.
Thus, there are advantages for Montana businesses, but there 
are also disadvantages and points of caution. By far the most 
serious problem or disadvantage is the one the businessman is 
likely to create. Conversion to computers can be compared to a 
man who has smoked for 15 years and suddenly stops. He 
will spend endless hours convincing everyone else that re­
fraining from cigarettes is “the only way to go.” The same 
may be true with computers; conversion to computers often 
leads to complete awe of the machine and its “magic.” There is 
no magic; the computer is just another tool.
National Indicators
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The second caution relates to problems of change-over. The 
old methods should never be scrapped before the new ones 
are really proven. Any conversion plan that does not provide 
either for parallel operation or for gradual rather than all-at- 
once conversion is an invitation to trouble. The temptations to 
try and fly before you can crawl will exist—resist them. 
Furthermore, an inefficient manual situation cannot be im­
proved by a direct jump to automated methods. The manual 
methods must be cleaned up first. It may seem like double 
work but, without it, there is grave danger of blanketing waste 
motion in the automated plan. There are cases where business­
men use five times as much time, money, and paper to place an 
order as is necessary. When they went to an automatic system, 
they did not eliminate the red tape, they simply automated it!
As another caution, businessmen must know what they want 
in a system before going out to purchase the equipment or the 
time on a computer. Never ask a hardware man, a computer 
salesman, if a thing can be done. The answer is always “yes.” 
Anything can be done but that is not the issue. What matters 
is whether anyone in his right mind would choose that way of 
doing it. Advice from hardware people is usually free, and 
although there are exceptions, the old adage is frequently true 
that advice which is free of charge, but not free of motivation, 
is worth about what you pay for it. There is no substitute for 
inside expertise and “inside” refers to people within the firm. 
No outsider knows as much about a firm’s problems as do the 
managers within the firm. Developing knowledge about the 
decisions which are made in a business, when they are made, 
and how management would like to have them made is a pre­
requisite to change—whether it be to computers or anything 
else. Those people who are instrumental in developing this 
knowledge will then have to acquire knowledge about the 
types of computer applications which may be feasible for their 
operation and about the alternative kinds of hardware which 
are available. When the firm is equipped with this knowledge, 
it is then ready to approach computer manufacturers for bids. 
Developing that knowledge may be a slow and painful process; 
but impatience is more costly.
In conclusion, there are a wide number of inventory control 
procedures which can be adopted within a business; if the 
groundwork is properly completed, there is no need to be like 
the wholesaler who had to wait until his competitor automated 
before he could compete. In the author’s opinion, those busi-
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nessmen, even the smaller ones in Montana, who do not evalu­
ate the possibilities for computer usage within their firms 
within the next five to ten years are running a pretty good 
chance of becoming obsolete and unable to compete. Note that 
the reference was to evaluation and not to usage. Some firms 
may not be able to use computers economically, but they should 
not prejudge the possibility by ignoring it. The evaluation is 
mandatory, but the tuition to this new school of thought comes 
high—don’t try to get it free.
An Economic View of the Draft
MAURICE C. TAYLOR
Visiting Professor of Business Administration 
University of Montana, Missoula
Most of the objection to the military draft on the part of 
American youth has been based on moral and ethical factors. 
While war (and the draft associated with it) is no doubt re­
prehensible in its own right, a more tangible, if not more sub­
stantive, case can be founded on economic grounds.
Some people classify the draft as “involuntary servitude.” 
If we take that point of view, conscription does not appear 
consistent with the American value system. The American 
value system seems to include the judgment that love of coun­
try and patriotism should serve as sufficient motivation for 
contributing military manpower in defense of the country or its 
ideals. This judgment, of course, is hardly consistent with the 
compulsory contribution of manpower by way of the draft. But 
the American value system is not noted for its internal con­
sistency, so we may ignore this one for the time being.
The military draft can and, in my view, should be viewed 
as a discriminatory tax. The military draft is a tax levied 
in kind, but this makes it no less a tax, although it certainly 
is taxation without representation in the case of draftees of 
minor age. An ordinary tax is levied in money terms and the 
tax is satisfied by a transfer of funds from the individual to 
government. The tax-in-kind via the draft is levied in terms of 
personal service contribution, and the tax is satisfied when the 
individual transfers himself and the services of his person to 
government for the specified time. This means the individual 
draftee, in addition to personal sacrifices, is paying the govern­
ment an amount of money equal to the difference between his 
foregone civilian income and his military income.
But that is not all; there are other obvious and subtle factors 
that make the tax discriminatory. In the first place, the tax 
applies only to the young. We will overlook the reasons for 
this limitation, except to say that it is based on the erroneous 
premise that only the young possess the health and vigor re­
quired of military manpower. (Parenthetically, one might also
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suggest that the minimum age requirement for holding politi­
cal legislative office usually exceeds the maximum eligibility 
age for the draft.) In any case, it is clear that the draft, in 
effect, results in an income transfer from young males to older 
people and to females. This leads to a further factor in the 
discrimination of the draft. It discriminates against males as 
compared to females. Third, the draft discriminates against 
the physically and mentally fit and in favor of those who are 
sub-par in physical and mental characteristics. While the latter 
discrimination may have some social justification, the ordinary 
tax system usually discriminates in such manner only in the 
case of rather extreme mental and physical disability.
In practice, the draft also discriminates against the poor and 
the less educated. The two most common methods of avoiding 
the burden of the draft tax are parenthood and college training 
status. Income and wealth enhance the use of both of these 
avoidance means. A recent study by Professors J. Ronnie Davis 
and Neil A. Palomba of Iowa State University indicates high 
school graduates bear about 55 percent of the burden of the 
draft even though they represent less than 40 percent of the 
manpower draft pool. College graduates, on the other hand, 
bear about three percent of the draft burden and represent 
about 12 percent of the manpower pool.1
Professors Davis and Palomba have also made estimates of 
the tax rates that apply to groups with different levels of edu­
cation. They define the “tax rate” as the draftee’s (or reluc­
tant volunteer’s) loss of income as a percentage of his sacrificed 
civilian income.2 The tax rates by education class are: (1) 
elementary education or less—58.55%; (2) one to three years 
of high school—69.37%; (3) high school graduates—73.43%; 
(4) one to three years of college—76.60%; and (5) college grad­
uates—82.10%. It may be noted that all of these tax rates are 
many times the ordinary income tax rates. It should also be 
noted that the tax rates are markedly progressive. The rate of 
taxation rises with the level of education and since there is a 
close correlation between education and civilian income level, 
the tax rates are also progressive with respect to income. But 
the income progressivity of the draft tax-in-kind may be more 
apparent than real. High tax rates serve as a motivation for
’J. Ronnie Davis and Neil A. Palomba, “On the Shifting of the Military 
Draft as a Progressive Tax-In-K ind,” W e s te r n  E co n o m ic  J o u rn a l, Vol. 
VII, No. 2, March 1968.
•The tax rate is Yc - Ym/Yc, where Yc =  civilian income and Ym 
=  military income.
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tax (draft) avoidance, and high incomes tend to make it easier 
to practice tax avoidance. Hence, we find the same thing as in 
ordinary state and federal income taxation. The effective tax 
rates are not nearly so progressive as the scheduled rates, and 
oftentimes the effective rates are not progressive at all.
What are the country’s alternatives to the military draft? Let 
us assume, for analytical convenience, that the military needs 
for manpower are given and unquestionable. Military en­
deavors, like other economically oriented activities, require 
resources. Manpower (labor) is obviously an important com­
ponent of these resources. Nonhuman resources or services 
are normally purchased from private economic units by con­
tract. In the draft era environment, human service (man­
power) has been largely conscripted or commandeered. Even
voluntary enlistments” have been to a great extent “forced 
sale contracts at far less than market rates of renumeration. 
One can hardly argue that the forced sale of productive 
services at below market prices on the one hand and the free 
choice sale of productive services at or above market prices on 
the other represent an equitable system.
Many alternatives to the manpower draft have been sug­
gested.  ̂The substitution of draft by lottery for “selective 
service” is a popular one. A lottery system without the present 
exemptions and deferments would improve the equity ele­
ments of selective service.” But conscription by chance rather 
than discretion, given the existing military pay structure, 
would certainly leave the economic inequities. Selection by 
draw or by random numbers is little better than selection by 
draft boards. A selectee chosen by lot is hardly less discrimin­
ated against than one chosen by a draft board because the dis­
crimination is basically economic. Universal military service 
is another popular alternative. The trouble with so-called uni­
versal military service is twofold. First, if the system has 
exemptions of any sort it ceases to be “universal.” A truly 
universal system could not discriminate with respect to sex, 
education or type of employment. Secondly, the discrimination 
against the suppliers of manpower as compared to the suppliers
of material would remain, as would the discrimination with 
respect to age.
A third alternative to the draft is to eliminate conscription 
and force the government into the manpower market on a 
more or less competitive basis—the way the government now 
obtains nonhuman productive services. At first glance this
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may appear to be a grossly impractical alternative. There is a 
tendency to assume that war is such a personally dangerous 
activity that men cannot be hired to participate in it. This 
assumption is patently false. The military manpower force is 
composed of seamen, technicians, doctors, lawyers, truck 
drivers, cooks, gunmen, pilots, medical aids, communications 
operators, construction workers, laborers, and sundry occupa­
tions. The assumption that the people in these and other occu­
pational groups have anything like a zero propensity to assume 
risk does not mesh with the facts. We might remind ourselves 
that people engage in skiing, sky diving, freeway driving and 
other forms of self-mayhem even when they have to pay for 
the privilege. The assumption that aversion to risk would 
preclude the hiring of a military labor force of three million 
has not been satisfactorily demonstrated. Such a force repre­
sents less than three and three quarters percent of the total 
labor force, and it is probably correct that the occupational 
composition of the military force now is comparable to the 
composition of the labor force as a whole in most respects 
Military recruiting puts great emphasis on the contention that 
military service trains the enlistee for various civilian occupa- 
tons. This may affect a few enlistees; but American experience 
is replete with evidence that economic reward itself will induce 
the taking of risk.
Another cliche is that paying military manpower what it is 
worth would be too costly. The real cost of national defense 
and security is represented by the lost production of the re­
sources going into it. In other words, the true manpower cost 
of defense is measured by what such manpower could produce 
in other lines of endeavor. Cost measured in any other way is 
artificial and results in inaccurate social accounting. The pre­
sent system certainly undervalues the true cost of military 
manpower and makes it impossible for society to optimize the 
use of its resources. There is no valid reason why manpower 
going into national security and defense could not be renum­
erated at the same rate as that going into other socio-economic 
endeavors. The market pricing of military manpower would 
have two clear advantages. One, the quality of the manpower 
services in the various military occupations would certainly 
rise. Two, market pricing would permit or force the military 
to economize in the use of its manpower. Nothing leads to 
waste and inefficiency more quickly than furnishing resources 
free or for less than their true worth.
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The money cost of the market pricing of military manpower 
is likely to be overestimated or overemphasized. There are an 
estimated three million enlisted men on active duty with the 
United States military forces.3 The average base pay is ap­
proximately $2,600.4 If the base pay rate had to be doubled in 
order to achieve a market pay rate, the total cost would amount 
to about $7.8 billion per year. This is a sizable sum of money, 
but it amounts to less than one percent of the national product 
and about four percent of federal expenditures.
Throughout this paper we have made the implicit assump­
tion that war and the draft are purely economic matters. We 
have suggested that war is reprehensible in its own right, but 
we have not dealt per se with the social losses associated with 
war. This is another matter. When a man is killed in military 
activity, both society and his estate suffer a loss beyond his 
term of service. In other words, the total loss amounts to the 
production that would have been forthcoming had he lived a 
normal life span. This is part of the cost of war. And while 
we cannot quantify the loss of a loved one, we can quantify 
the direct economic loss.
The death of a 20 year old high school graduate would result 
in lost earnings or productivity of about $238,000.® Assuming 
that $2,000 per year would have been required to maintain 
the man had he lived, the net loss in production amounts to 
about $158,000. On the same basis, the death of a 24 year old 
college graduate amounts to a net production loss of $284,000.° 
These figures demonstate that war casualties result in tre­
mendous economic loss, not to mention heartbreak and sorrow.
It seems reasonable to expect that an individual (or his estate 
in the case of death) ought to be compensated for such risk. 
This can be accomplished either by pay rates high enough to 
compensate for the risk or by insurance.
3U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, S ta tis t ic a l  
A b s tr a c t  o f  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s , 1967, Table 371, p. 263.
*Ibid., Table 381, p. 268.
’Herman P. Miller and Richard A. Hornseth, P re se n t V a lu e  o f  E s t im a te d  
L ife t im e  E a rn in g s , Technical Paper 16, U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census, 1967, pp. 9 and 51. (These estimates are based 
upon the assumption of a 4 percent annual increase in wages from 
productivity and price level increases and a discount rate of 4 percent. 
The estimates are on the conservative side because they are calculated 
for the “average person” and are based on 1959 levels of earnings.)
*Ib id , pp. 10 and 52. (This estimate is based on the assumption that 
$3,000 per year would have been required for personal maintenance 
versus the $2,000 in the case of the high school graduate.)
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The present draft makes neither economic nor social sense. 
The system fails to meet the test of either social equity or 
economic efficiency. If the term “un-American” has any rele­
vance at all, it certainly can be applied to the present military 
draft. According to the American value system it is “un- 
American” to deprive citizens of their property without just 
compensation and due process. Labor power and productive 
personal service represent the chief property of most Ameri­
cans, especially American youth. Depriving particular seg­
ments of society of such property rights does not conform to 
the American ideal of economic freedom. A paid military force 
which would attract personnel voluntarily would lead to both 
greater efficiency and improved equity.
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It’s a long way from a wheat ranch in eastern Montana or the 
Dakotas to the crowded streets of Manila or Tokyo, but the 
distance is getting shorter—thanks, in part, to an unusual new 
freight rate structure developed by Montana railroads. In 1966- 
67 approximately 24.1 million bushels of hard spring wheat 
produced in the area were shipped through north Pacific coast 
ports to the Far East. Two years earlier, in 1964-65—before the 
new export rates had taken effect—total shipments amounted 
to only 3.8 million bushels. This is the story of the development 
of the inverse rate structure and its effect on exports of hard 
spring wheat from Montana and the Dakotas.
Like all Americans, Montana farmers and Montanans in 
general have a significant stake in the export of U. S. agricul­
tural products. During the year ending June 30, 1966, U. S. 
exports of farm products added up to approximately $6.7 bil­
lion.1 Montana’s share of these agricultural exports was valued 
at $126.6 million, or roughly one-fourth of its total farm sales 
during the period. Almost one-fifth ($1.3 billion) of the total 
value of U. S. agricultural exports consisted of wheat, and 
Montana, of course, is a major wheat producing state. Its dol­
lar share of wheat exports in 1965-66 was estimated at $93.0 
million.2
’Compared to $4.5 billion in agricultural imports. Commercial exports 
for dollars amounted to $5.1 billion, a new record; in addition, $1.6 
billion in agricultural products were exported under various govern­
ment programs. Source of figures: Economic Research Service, U. S. 
Department of Agriculture, Foreign A gricultural Trade o f the  U nited  
States, November 1966, p. 24.
“Ibid., p. 14. The export value for U. S. agricultural commodities is the 
value at port of exportation; it is based on the selling price (or cost, 
if not sold) and includes inland freight, insurance, and other charges 
to the port.
26 M O N T A N A  B U SIN E SS  Q U A R T E R L Y
Until very recently, the United States had a huge surplus of 
wheat, a burden both to farmers, operating under acreage 
restrictions, and to taxpayers, footing the bill for storage costs. 
As wheat carry-overs piled up after World War II, it was ob­
vious that increased exports would reduce the surplus and 
the cost of storage, and might over a longer period result in 
increased acreage allotments for producers. Increased dollar 
sales of wheat to other countries would also help to ease the 
national balance of payments problem. There were many rea­
sons to encourage the development of programs designed to 
promote larger export sales of American wheat.
The Far East, with its growing population and improving 
economic conditions, obviously represented a potential market 
for American wheat. Recognizing this, private trade organiza­
tions and the U. S. Department of Agriculture developed many 
programs to promote and explain the uses of wheat in the 
Orient. Wheat products began to be accepted in Japan and in 
other Asian countries; and during the latter part of the 1950’s 
and the early 1960’s wheat exports from the United States to 
the Far East and the Middle East increased substantially.
Much of the increase was due to larger shipments to India, 
Pakistan, and South Korea under federal programs, especially 
Title I of Public Law 480, which provides for payment in the 
currency of the purchasing country. But commercial sales for 
dollars also increased, especially to Japan and the Philippines.
U. S. ports on the north Pacific coast were natural supply 
sources for these Asian countries, but most of the wheat 
shipped from these ports had traditionally been soft white 
wheat from Washington, Oregon, and Idaho. To the east of 
these states, of course, lay the great hard spring wheat-pro­
ducing areas of Montana, North and South Dakota, and western 
Minnesota. Most of the hard red spring wheat produced in the 
United States comes from this area.3 Japan, the Philippines, 
and other eastern countries were interested in purchasing hard 
wheat, which has superior baking qualities, and the U. S. De­
partment of Agriculture wanted to encourage increased com­
mercial exports of this wheat. Here was an opportunity to re­
duce the huge surplus of hard spring wheat, which exceeded
aIn 1965, Montana produced 31,754,000 bushels of spring wheat (exclud­
ing durum); North Dakota, 118,139,000 bushels; South Dakota, 
27,558,000 bushels; and Minnesota, 19,800,000 bushels. Their combined 
production of 197,251,000 bushels was equal to 84 percent of total U. S. 
spring wheat production in that year. Source: U. S. Department of 
Agriculture, A gricultural Statistics, 1966, p. 5.
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200 million bushels in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. Not 
only were producers and shippers in Montana and the Dakotas 
anxious to reach Asian markets, but railroads serving these 
states and the Pacific coast saw the possibility of increased 
traffic over their lines.
The major obstacle to selling Asian markets through north 
Pacific ports was the competition of Canadian wheat. Spring 
wheat produced in Alberta and Saskatchewan (Manitoba No. 
3) is comparable in quality to American hard spring wheat, but 
prices for Canadian wheat, all of which is sold by the Canadian 
Wheat Board, were lower, and so were Canadian transportation 
costs for similar distances. The Crowsnest Pass Agreement of 
1897 between the Canadian government and the Canadian 
railroads set rates for grain which are still in effect and are 
substantially below cost. These low freight rates make it easy 
for Canadian wheat to move to the west coast and on to the 
Orient. Because there is little difference in the quality of 
American and Canadian hard spring wheat, prospective pur­
chasers were interested only in a competitive price and in 
assurances of adequate supplies from one year to another. 
During the early 1960’s most Japanese purchases were made 
from the Canadian Wheat Board.
Because U. S. domestic wheat prices were higher than those 
in Canada and other countries, the establishment of a competi­
tive American price depended upon two factors: export subsidy 
payments and reduced transportation costs to the Pacific coast. 
Export subsidy payments are made by the Department of 
Agriculture to exporters to bridge the gap between the price 
they receive in the world market and the price they pay for 
wheat on the domestic market, plus the cost of the export 
marketing certificate which they were required to purchase 
until the 1966 crop year. Export subsidies, of course, were al­
ready in effect and the federal government was willing to con­
tinue them in order to move more wheat overseas. But if 
American hard spring wheat were to compete with Canadian 
wheat at north Pacific ports, adjustments in rail rates also were 
necessary. In July 1964, rates on export wheat shipped from 
Montana and North Dakota to the north Pacific coast had been 
lowered, but still wheat did not move in any quantity from 
eastern Montana and the Dakotas into the Far East market. 
When freight charges were deducted from the Portland price, 
the price received by the seller was too low. The domestic mar­
ket remained more attractive and wheat from the three-state
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area continued to go to Minnesota markets or into storage. In 
1965, further reductions in export freight rates were requested 
by a group of grain growers associations, state agencies, and 
grain dealers.
In studying the potential market for hard red spring wheat 
in the Far East, the four railroads involved—the Northern 
Pacific, Great Northern, Milwaukee Road, and Soo Line—be­
came convinced that any rate structure which, in the tra­
ditional manner, increased with the distance eastward was 
impractical. In order to insure an adequate supply of spring 
wheat for export at north Pacific ports year after year, it was 
vital that wheat be available from the Dakotas. Eastern Mon­
tana’s production alone could not satisfy the anticipated de­
mand. (See footnote 3.) Therefore, the railways felt that only 
an inverse rate structure would provide the largest reductions 
at points where country elevator prices, based on the Minne­
apolis market, are highest; that is, the eastern Dakotas. Such 
an inverse rate structure would mean that prices received in 
the Dakotas for wheat destined for export through Pacific 
coast ports would compare favorably with prices received for 
wheat shipped to Minneapolis. In this way, the inverse rate 
structure would help insure that spring wheat from these 
states would move westward to north Pacific coast ports.
This meant that, beginning at about Saco, Montana, the 
farther east a shipper was located, the lower his rail export 
rate to Portland would be. Obviously, this was a revolutionary 
change.
The new rates should also put the north Pacific ports on the 
same export rate basis as Gulf ports from most of the origins— 
even though spring wheat from this area does not generally 
move through Gulf ports to the Far East. If the new rates met 
these qualifications, then no damage to the Gulf ports would 
result.
The inverse rate structure for export wheat was proposed 
by the carriers in February 1965. It provided for reductions in 
rates up to 25 cents per hundredweight from the eastern Da­
kotas and Minnesota; most Montana rates, except from the 
easternmost points, remained the same.4 The reception given
‘Edmund A. Nightingale, Som e E ffects o f Recent Changes in  Transpor­
tation Rates and Facilities on Interregional Com petition and Regional 
D evelopm ent W ith  Special R eference to the  R ailw ay Grain Rate  
Structure, Report prepared for Workshop on Transportation sponsored 
jointly by Resource Economics Committee, Great Plains Agricultural 
Council and Western Regional Marketing Research Committee, Western
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to the proposed new structure was not all enthusiastic; a freight 
rate which was higher the shorter the distance the wheat was 
hauled didn’t make sense to a lot of people. Montana opponents 
termed it “ridiculous.” They pointed out that our state is rarely 
in favorable geographic position with respect to freight rates. 
North Dakota producers, they said, had always enjoyed a 
higher per bushel net return because they were closer to Min­
neapolis; now, with Montana closer to a new export market, 
the railroads were trying to take that advantage away. Under 
the proposed rate structure, Montana wheat producers shipping 
to the Coast would pay higher freight rates and receive a lower 
return than Dakota producers. A shipper in Saco, Montana, for 
example, would pay 90 cents per hundredweight freight; a 
shipper in Grand Forks, North Dakota, would pay only 70 
cents.
In general, these Montana critics agreed that the inverse rate 
structure would move wheat to the export market; but so, they 
believed, would reductions in existing rates. They preferred 
this proposal in order to avoid apparent inequities among ship­
pers.
Objections also came from port officials in Houston, Galves­
ton, and New Orleans, who claimed that the new rates would 
be detrimental to their interests.
Nevertheless, in April 1965 the Trans-Continental Freight 
Bureau adopted the carriers’ proposal; and in May the Bureau 
applied to the Interstate Commerce Commission for permission 
to depart from Section 4 of the Interstate Commerce Act (the 
long-and-short haul clause), which the inverse rate structure 
obviously violated. This permission was granted in June, and 
the inverse rate adjustment became effective on June 11, 1965.
The new rates, then, were applied to the 1965 crop. The ef­
fects were dramatic indeed. Between July 1, 1965 and June 30, 
1966, approximately 20 million bushels of hard spring wheat 
were shipped from north Pacific coast ports; during the pre­
vious twelve months the figure had been less than four million 
bushels. A further increase in 1966-67 raised total exports to 
24.1 million bushels, nearly all of which was produced in Mon­
tana and the Dakotas and shipped by rail. (Figure 1.)
The leading purchasers were the Philippines (13 million 
bushels) and Japan (6 million bushels). Both these nations 
are cash customers. The year 1967-68 probably will see another
Agricultural Economics Research Council, Denver, Colorado, Novem­
ber 30-December 2, 1965.
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FIGURE 1
EXPORTS OF HARD SPRING WHEAT THROUGH PACIFIC 
COAST PORTS, MARKETING YEARS 1958-59 
THROUGH 1966-67
Source: U. S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 
The W heat S itua tion .
increase in shipments of hard spring wheat through north Pa­
cific ports, despite a near record world wheat crop in 1967 and 
declining total import demand. From July through December 
1967, 18.1 million bushels were inspected for export. Alto­
gether, between July 1965 and January 1968 more than 62 
million bushels of hard red spring wheat moved through Puget 
Sound and Columbia River ports. Almost the entire amount 
represented dollar sales. (Table 1.)
Of course, the new rate structure alone was not responsible 
for these gains. The overseas demand for hard spring wheat 
is growing; total U. S. exports of this wheat have increased in 
approximately the same ratio as have exports from Pacific 
ports. The market is dependent upon a federal subsidy to in­
sure competitive prices for American wheat.
Nevertheless, the inverse rate structure has worked to make
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TABLE 1
EXPORTS OF HARD RED SPRING WHEAT THROUGH NORTH 
PACIFIC COASTS BY COUNTRY OF DESTINATION, 
MARKETING YEARS 1965-66, 1966-67,
AND FIRST HALF 1967-68 
(thousands of bushels)
Country
Ju ly  1, 1965- 
June  30, 1966
Ju ly  1, 1966- 
June  30, 1967
Ju ly  1, 1967 
Dec. 31, 1967 
(6 m onths)
Japan ............................. 6,435 5,935 6,851
Philippines ......... ............. .... 10,739 12,832 7,306
Taiwan ................ ....... .... .........  842 1,162 503
Other Asia1 ___________ 1,009 1,331 784
Total Asia ............... ..... .........  19,025 21,260 15,444
Non-Asia .......... ............. . 900 2,889 2,634
TOTAL __________ ________19,925 24,149 18,078
Note: The wheat marketing years run from July  1 to June 30. 
‘Hong Kong, Malaysia, Okinawa, Singapore and Thailand. 
Source: U. S. Department of Agriculture, G r a in  M a r k e t  N e w s .
it possible for large amounts of wheat from Montana and the 
Dakotas to reach Asian markets. The area’s wheat producers, 
the country elevators, the grain brokers, the railroads, and the 
Pacific coast terminals and exporters have all benefited. Per­
haps some other pattern of freight reduction would have 
worked as well. No doubt a good many Montana producers 
still fail to see the logic of a rate structure which seems to 
penalize them, even though one well-known transportation ex­
pert, Dr. Edmund A. Nightingale of the University of Minne­
sota, has described the inverse rate structure as an “ . . . out­
standing example of constructive managerial imagination, 
initiative, and cooperation . . . ”6 Montanans have not been 
prone to use such laudatory language in describing the rail­
roads operating in their state, and the recently proposed gen­
eral freight rate increase has added to their longstanding con­
cern with rail transportation costs. Nevertheless, the develop­
ment and application of the inverse rate structure stands as 
an example of a successful innovation by railway management 
which deserves recognition.
‘Edmund A. Nightingale, op. cit., p. 47.

